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We consider how in issue selling, subsidiaries draw on different forms of legitimacy to attract 
corporate headquarters’ (CHQ) positive attention and minimise negative CHQ attention. 
Through case study evidence, we find that directing CHQ attention to subsidiary issues needs 
to be executed as a balancing act through forms of subsidiary legitimacy, namely; the personal 
legitimacy of key individuals at the subsidiary; consequential legitimacy vis-à-vis peer 
subsidiaries; and linkage legitimacy in the local environment. We develop a typology of 
subsidiary issue-selling roles and illustrate how negative CHQ attention results from a failure 
to legitimise issue selling. 
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The multinational enterprise (MNE) is increasingly portrayed as an internal market system 
where intense intra-firm competition between subsidiaries is inevitable (Birkinshaw & 
Lingblad, 2005; Chen et al. 2011; Luo, 2005). The structure of the corporate headquarters 
(CHQ)-subsidiary relationship has evolved from a focus on formal bureaucratic control to an 
informal differentiated network (Kostova et al. 2016; Kunisch et al. 2014). Subsidiaries are 
often encouraged to compete for resources from their CHQ, but arguably the most valuable and 
limited of these resources is the way the CHQ’s ‘attention’ is devolved across the MNE (Ambos 
et al. 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a; Bouquet et al. 2016). The fight for CHQ attention 
has been well documented in recent studies. These studies have largely focused solely on how 
subsidiaries attract ‘positive’ attention in the form of material resources from CHQ and how 
this subsequently contributes to the performance of the subsidiary’s role over time (Ambos & 
Birkinshaw, 2010; Bouquet et al. 2015). Positive attention is generally regarded as a forward 
looking and value enhancing corporate resource for subsidiaries, and research has shown that 
it can be a prerequisite to developing subsidiary bargaining power and autonomy within the 
MNE (Bouquet et al. 2009).  
Attention in the MNE can be conceptualised as the expression of a zero sum relationship 
between the CHQ and the subsidiary in that attention to one subsidiary subsequently means 
less attention to others (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Birkinshaw et al. 2007). Within this 
‘attention market’ subsidiaries ultimately attempt to redirect or buffer CHQ’s attention to 
emerging trends or developments in their local environments (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a; 
Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2009; Ocasio, 2011). We draw on issue-selling arguments as a lens to 
investigate how subsidiaries direct CHQ attention to key issues at the subsidiary level. 
Directing attention to important issues can be a risky endeavour for subsidiaries as it is 
fundamentally an entrepreneurial process where subsidiaries promote unique and unfamiliar 
ideas (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton & Jackson, 1987). Competition for positive CHQ 
attention may cause the subsidiary to take risks in promoting issues that are misaligned with 
the mandate initially set out by CHQ. The subsidiary’s behaviour may be misconstrued by 
CHQ as self-serving or disingenuous, largely due to CHQ’s limited knowledge of these issues 
a-priori (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a). Attention biases such as bounded rationality and 
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ethnocentrism can also generate suspicion and even hostility from CHQ, particularly if issues 
have come from unfamiliar sources (Barner-Rasmussen et al. 2010; Birkinshaw & Ridderstrale, 
1999; Bouquet et al. 2016). Over time this may result in what we term ‘negative’ CHQ 
attention, which we define as direct or indirect interventions from CHQ that destroy value at 
the subsidiary level. Negative attention can be difficult to differentiate from CHQ control or 
monitoring (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a) but it is essentially an undesirable outcome for 
subsidiaries. However, to date, the literature on theories of attention within the MNE focuses 
almost exclusively on positive CHQ attention (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Birkinshaw et al. 
2007; Ocasio, 2011), largely ignoring the ‘darker side’ of negative CHQ attention. Directing 
positive CHQ attention can be a double-edged sword, as it risks attracting negative CHQ 
attention, which can lead to the destruction of the subsidiary’s role. This clearly represents a 
key risk for subsidiary managers and heretofore the academic literature has largely been silent 
in terms of helping them understand the dynamic. Understanding how subsidiaries balance this 
process is a key problem that our study aims to explore.   
The current paper argues that successful issue selling is predicated on a set of legitimating 
forms specific to the subsidiary. Research generally focused on organisational legitimacy has 
shown that it can be used for both attracting valuable resources (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; 
Zott & Huy, 2007) and combating an unfavourable image (Suchman, 1995). To date, research 
has largely neglected the role of legitimacy at the subsidiary level as a means to understand the 
subsidiary relationship with CHQ. We argue that subsidiaries have to work hard to legitimise 
key issues, which portrays them as committed corporate citizens playing by the rules of the 
corporate game. Further, it is essential that these issues are sold in a way that ensures their 
alignment with the corporate agenda. Our paper addresses this problem by investigating how 
subsidiaries use different forms of legitimacy to direct positive CHQ attention to key issues 
while simultaneously limiting or minimising negative CHQ attention.  
We identify three specific forms of subsidiary legitimacy and illuminate how each of these 
attracts positive CHQ attention. The particular forms of subsidiary legitimacy we identify are 
the personal legitimacy of key individuals at the subsidiary (supportive attention), 
consequential legitimacy vis-à-vis peer subsidiaries (relative attention) and linkage legitimacy 
from the subsidiary’s local environment (visible attention). Our research begins to fill the void 
in terms of empirical work on negative CHQ attention by illustrating how subsidiaries that do 
not align their issue-selling endeavours with these particular forms of legitimacy ultimately 
attracted negative attention from CHQ. In so doing we also develop a typology of subsidiary 
 4 
issue-selling roles that explains how the level of legitimacy a subsidiary has impacts both the 
quality and quantity of attention it receives from CHQ.  These concerns are critical, as positive 
CHQ attention can be central to maintaining the development of a subsidiary’s influential 
position within the MNE. Equally, negative CHQ attention may threaten the subsidiary’s 
relationship with key corporate decision makers and ultimately limit its opportunities in 
attaining future corporate investment. Indeed, negative CHQ attention may ultimately destroy 
value at the subsidiary level and potentially to the MNE as a whole. Hence, these concerns are 
relevant for both corporate executives and subsidiary managers in enhancing the efficient 
management and allocation of resources across the MNE network.  
Drawing on and contributing to two distinct but interrelated fields of work, namely - subsidiary 
issue selling (Balogun et al. 2011; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Ling et al. 2005) and organisational 
legitimacy - (Bitekine, 2011; Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zott & Huy, 2007) 
we contribute to the attention oriented perspective on the MNE (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; 
Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a; Birkinshaw et al. 2009; Bouquet et al 2016; Ocasio, 2011) by 
exhibiting legitimacy as a key determinant for attracting and capturing positive CHQ attention, 
while concomitantly minimising negative CHQ attention. The paper is structured as follows; 
the next section positions the current study within the literature on CHQ attention before 
outlining subsidiary issue selling and legitimacy in the MNE. The second section details the 
qualitative exploratory methodology of this study. Thirdly, we present the empirical findings 
and finally, we discuss the findings and their theoretical and practical implications. 
 
2. Attention from Corporate Headquarters 
2.1 Positive CHQ Attention  
Studies that examine attention in the MNE primarily consider positive CHQ attention, defined 
as the extent to which CHQ recognises and gives credit to the subsidiary for its contribution to 
the MNE (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a). Positive attention is generally regarded as a valuable 
resource that is challenging for subsidiaries to attain, but equally as complex for CHQ to 
allocate (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2009). Positive CHQ attention may unfold in three ways; 
‘supportive’, through the provision of resources to support subsidiary development; ‘relative’ 
vis-à-vis peer subsidiaries, or ‘visible’ through the explicit recognition of the subsidiary from 
CHQ in the media (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a). Positive attention allows the subsidiary to 
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stay connected with headquarters (supportive attention), raise their profile within the MNE 
(relative attention) and with external stakeholders (visible attention) (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 
2010). Supportive attention may be demonstrated through CHQ endorsement in the form of 
further investment, monetary bonuses for senior executives or mandate extension for 
subsidiaries. Relative attention is the result of a zero-sum game in which subsidiaries compete 
to enhance their position internally in the MNE (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a). However, we 
add that the competition for attention needs to be balanced with collaborative approaches, such 
as best practice sharing in order for the subsidiary to avoid being perceived as self-serving. We 
argue that visible attention is the recognition a subsidiary gains from CHQ based on its external 
connections in the local environment. Locally distinctive linkages can provide visibility for the 
subsidiary at CHQ that might not have been achievable based solely on the subsidiary’s merit.  
From the CHQ perspective, international attention is considered a finite and perishable 
resource, where time and effort should be effectively invested in external overseas 
communications, internal executive discussions, or global scanning activities in order to assess 
opportunities and threats (Bouquet et al. 2009; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). From the subsidiary 
perspective, extant research has foregrounded the importance of a subsidiary’s structural 
characteristics, such as the strategic role or mandate, in attracting positive CHQ attention 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Delany, 2000; Mudambi et al. 2014; O’Donnell, 2000; Reilly & 
Sharkey Scott, 2013). The significance of the subsidiary’s strategic location (Cantwell & 
Mudambi, 2011) or an enhanced global network (Andersson et al. 2007) for example can add 
‘weight’ to the subsidiary’s attention attracting efforts (Birkinshaw et al. 2007; Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008a). Studies also consider the way subsidiaries may use subtle relational 
approaches to attract attention such as profile building (Barsoux & Bouquet, 2013), initiative 
taking (Ambos et al.  2010; Schmid et al. 2014) or micro-political strategies (Geppert & 
Dorrenbacher, 2014), to ‘vocalise’ the subsidiary’s achievements, depicting it as a valuable 
contributor the MNE (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a).  
2.2 Negative CHQ Attention  
CHQ attention is not always a desirable outcome for subsidiaries. The extant literature largely 
neglects exploring how subsidiaries can inadvertently attract unwanted or negative attention 
from CHQ (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a). We define negative CHQ attention as direct or 
indirect interventions that destroy value at the subsidiary level. Negative attention has the 
potential to suffocate or even disempower the subsidiary over time (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 
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2008a; Bouquet et al. 2015) and is generally characterised by excessive CHQ intervention in 
subsidiary activities. We argue that intervention may occur directly or indirectly. ‘Direct’ CHQ 
intervention may result in increased monitoring (Taggart, 1997), expatriate deployment 
(Plourde et al. 2014) or even mandate removal (Dorrenbacher & Gammelgaard, 2010). 
Resistance and scepticism towards the subsidiary, which can lead to the dismissal of future 
proposals, also represent a direct form of negative CHQ attention. These direct forms of 
negative attention resemble attempts from CHQ to control the subsidiary, as CHQ may believe 
the subsidiary’s behaviour is subversive and not aligned with the overall strategic agenda of 
the MNE. However, we argue that negative CHQ attention can also be ‘indirect’, where the 
CHQ is actively trying to support - not control - the subsidiary and may have good intentions 
in intervening. Bouquet et al (2009) observe that as CHQ devotes further attention to successful 
subsidiaries, corporate executives may develop a desire for additional information and 
overcommit themselves to certain issues. For example, CHQ may intervene excessively in 
prosperous early stage projects and request too much information or undertake too many visits. 
This may result in CHQ ‘hyperattention’, and prevent subsidiaries from achieving higher 
performance levels due to a drain on time (Bouquet et al. 2015). Indirect negative attention can 
therefore inadvertently destroy value in successful subsidiaries, even though the CHQ may be 
attempting to add value.  
Research also confirms that the CHQ’s ability to detect and interpret the quality of a given 
subsidiary issue is limited and largely inadequate (Ambos & Mahnke, 2010; Bouquet et al. 
2009; Dellestrand, 2011). Attention biases at CHQ in the form of bounded rationality and 
ethnocentrism may be drivers of negative attention and may cause the CHQ to act with 
ignorance, destroying the potential value of an issue (Birkinshaw et al. 2007; Bouquet et al. 
2016; Ciabuschi et al. 2011). Additionally, subsidiaries are naturally subordinate within the 
hierarchy of formal power, and the initial benefits of their issues are difficult for CHQ to 
determine a priori (Barsoux & Bouquet, 2013; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Taggart, 1997).  
Other studies highlight a potential ‘double-edge’ to promoting the success of an organisation. 
Managers face a ‘self-promoter’s paradox’ by attracting unwanted or excessive attention, 
owing to the fact that they may have over promoted the success of the organisation (Ashforth 
& Gibbs, 1990). This suggests that subsidiaries, which are over-aggressive in their attempts to 
attract positive attention from CHQ, may inadvertently be perceived as self-serving or 
subversive and may attract negative attention. Negative attention may also be differentiated 
from isolation or indifference. Indifference or isolation from CHQ equates to particulalry low 
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levels of attention and can eventually lead to lower performance levels from the subsidiary 
over time (Monteiro et al 2008). Ultimately, the prevailing issue for subsidiaries should not 
merely be about attracting CHQ attention, as many past studies have focused on, but rather, the 
quality and quantity of attention.  
 
2.3 Subsidiary Issue Selling  
CHQ attention, either positive or negative, should be regarded as the selective interpretation of 
key ‘issues’ which originate at the subsidiary level (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010). Despite this, 
the application of issue-selling arguments in advancing the attention perspective of the MNE 
have largely been overlooked (Ansoff, 1980; Ocasio, 2011). Observed through the lens of 
impression management, issue selling is an upward influencing technique where subsidiaries 
act as ‘sellers’ in an internal market system (Balogun et al. 2011; Dutton et al. 2001). In this 
way, subsidiary managers conceive of, suggest or trigger new ideas that executives may neither 
foresee nor attend to, allowing lower level managers to shape the overall strategic agenda of 
the MNE (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Issues that are considered strategic or valuable to the 
corporate agenda should capture positive attention, as these constitute events, developments 
and opportunities that are viewed as having implications for the organisation’s performance 
(Ansoff, 1980; Dutton & Jackson, 1987). Successful subsidiaries generally develop the 
capacity to evaluate the MNE context before they decide to sell. Contextual conditions such as 
CHQ support from previous interactions, open-mindedness and relationship quality provide 
‘psychological safety’ for the seller (Dutton et al. 1997; Dutton et al. 2002). In contrast, 
downsizing, uncertainty and fear of negative consequences are more likely to prevent selling 
activities (Dutton et al. 1997; Ling et al. 2005).  
Research on issue selling has advanced our understanding of how subsidiaries can use a variety 
of issue-selling ‘moves’ (Dutton & Ashford 1993; Dutton et al. 2001). For example, 
‘packaging’ or revealing information on an issue to CHQ in a language they can understand, 
or ‘bundling’ with other related issues help ‘frame’ issues positively (Gammelgaard, 2009). An 
issue that is framed as strategic, urgent, threatening or uncertain to resolve is more likely to be 
attended to (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). A high degree of strategic knowledge regarding the 
corporate agenda is valuable in framing issues in ways that would be perceived positively 
(Dutton et al. 2001). Subsidiaries that possess knowledge of the MNE’s norms and goals are 
more likely to sell issues through private channels (one-to-one meetings) or public mechanisms 
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(staff meetings, annual strategy events). Choosing whether to ‘go it alone’ or solicit support 
may also affect how an issue is endorsed. Managers may sell issues both formally, through 
official tactics such as scheduled presentations and reports, or informally, through personal 
appeals, hallway discussions and behind the scenes negotiations (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; 
Ling et al. 2005). However, the issue-selling process evolves over time, and effective moves at 
one point in time may become redundant later (Howard-Grenville, 2007). Effective issue 
selling is a temporary process without a-priori successfully defined moves (Dutton et al. 1997). 
Therefore, repeated interactions assist managers to navigate the attention market (Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2009) by experimenting with new moves, learning about recent changes at CHQ 
and acquiring more relevant capabilities (Howard-Grenville, 2007).  
As suggested, directing positive CHQ attention to particular issues may represent a departure 
from a subsidiary’s established mandate, risking attraction of negative CHQ attention. CHQ 
attempt to mitigate strategic ambiguity by directing positive attention disproportionately to 
issues that are deemed legitimate and in line with the corporate agenda while, concomitantly 
directing negative attention to those issues that are not. We thus argue that subsidiaries need to 
focus on selling issues that are perceived as legitimate and can do so by drawing on specific 
forms of legitimacy at their disposal.  
2.4 Legitimacy of Subsidiary Issue Selling 
Legitimacy is defined as a social perception of acceptance or appropriateness indicating that 
the actions of an organisation are proper or appropriate within a socially constructed system of 
norms, values and beliefs (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman and 
Zeitz, 2002). The ability of the MNE to achieve and maintain high levels of legitimacy is 
critical to accessing key resources and survival (Kostova et al. 2008; Rosenzweig & Sing, 1991, 
Tregaskis, 2003; Westney, 1993). The literature on organisational legitimacy has documented 
that legitimacy is anchored in a wide range of distinct but interrelated forms (Bitekine, 2011; 
Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zott & Huy, 2007). Clearly identifying which 
dimensions of the organisation’s activities, procedures, personnel, outcomes and relationships 
are being ‘judged’ is key for recognising the most appropriate forms of legitimacy in particular 
circumstances (Bitekine, 2011). Despite this, we still know very little about how legitimacy is 
managed internally at the CHQ-subsidiary interface. Scholars call for a more nuanced 
understanding of how legitimacy is garnered or leveraged in social and political interactions 
within the MNE (Kostova et al., 2008). We draw insights from organisational legitimacy 
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(Bitekine, 2011; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Suchman, 1995; Zott & Huy, 2007) in arguing that 
the subsidiary’s legitimacy originates from three main sources or contexts in the MNE 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). These contexts are the CHQ-subsidiary relationship, peer unit 
interactions and the local external environment.  
In the context of CHQ-subsidiary relationship, it is important to examine the personal 
legitimacy of key individuals at the subsidiary level, as this is poorly understood. These 
individuals may use their legitimacy to attract supportive CHQ attention to key issues. 
According to Suchman (1995), personal legitimacy involves drive, conviction, or willingness 
to develop innovative ideas and approaches to interact with CHQ. Further, an individual’s 
qualifications and certifications (for example from reputable business schools) similar to those 
of senior managers also signal personal legitimacy (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Individuals who 
spend more time at corporate offices can use this exposure to tap into networks of influence 
(Barsoux & Bouquet, 2013; Kostova & Roth, 2003) and create ties with key executive decision 
makers (Reiche, 2011; Taylor, 2007). These avenues provide opportunities for individuals to 
regularly interact with key corporate decision makers and identify with decision makers’ 
preferences and values (Molloy & Delany, 1998; Schotter & Beamish, 2011; Vora et al. 2007).  
Theoretically, the potential for the subsidiary to deploy a ‘cooptation of elite’ individuals 
across the MNE and use these individuals to enhance the subsidiary’s position has been alluded 
to (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b). From the subsidiary perspective, this resonates with studies 
illustrating how CHQ purposely ‘pollinate’ the MNE with expatriates to control subsidiaries 
(Harzing, 2002). Personal legitimacy is not solely associated with formal authority and may 
instead be based on high levels of political and social skill (Harvey & Novicevic, 2004). 
Valuable knowledge, capabilities and skills offer the potential to identify with the logic of CHQ 
any may enhance the number of influential supporters at CHQ (Birkinshaw et al. 2007; 
Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b). We argue that key individuals at the subsidiary with high 
levels of personal legitimacy can be used to sell critical issues, making it easier to direct 
supportive CHQ attention to these issues. 
Another important source of subsidiary legitimacy originates from interactions with peer units. 
Suchman (1995) argues that consequential legitimacy originates from an organisation’s 
achievements, activities, structures and processes relative to its peers. Subsidiaries are therefore 
generally judged against the performance of peer subsidiaries (Becker-Ritterspach & 
Dorrenbacher 2011; Birkinshaw & Lingblad, 2005; Najafi-Tavani et al. 2013) and research 
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shows that this behaviour is based largely on ‘coopetition’ activities i.e. collaboration and 
competition between subsidiaries (Luo, 2005). For example, the subsidiary’s track record in 
solving problems or fulfilling specific requests from CHQ more often than other subsidiaries 
can be critical (Ambos et al. 2010; Barsoux & Bouquet, 2013; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001). 
Studies have demonstrated that competition with other internal subsidiaries is a central strategic 
agenda, hence it is imperative for the subsidiary to be vigilant and proactive in ‘advocating 
bases of comparison’ (Molloy & Delany, 1998) or enhancing their ‘optimal distinctiveness’ 
(Garcia-Pont et al. 2009). Similarly, research on legitimacy emphasises how an organisation 
can control its image by communicating coherent and consistent stories based on past 
performance records (Suchman, 1995). Best practice transfer or reverse knowledge transfer 
(RKT) (Ambos et al. 2006; Rabbiosi, 2011), for example, can also demonstrate to the CHQ the 
relative valuable contribution of the subsidiary (Najafi-Tavani et al. 2013). Therefore, we argue 
that the consequential legitimacy generated from peer interactions can be critical for directing 
CHQ relative attention to issues.      
The local environment is another important source of legitimacy for subsidiaries. It has been 
argued that the ‘linkage’ legitimacy an organisation receives in this regard can be cultivated by 
‘piggybacking’ on the reputations or endorsements of key local actors or partners (Baum & 
Oliver, 1991; Chan & Makino, 2007; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Subsidiaries can foster 
external legitimacy in the local context by establishing relationships with central actors such 
as government officials, media, trade unions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
suppliers and customers (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Becker-Ritterspach & Dorrenbacher, 2011; 
Hillman & Wan, 2005; Tregaskis, 2003). However, they way subsidiaries design their issue 
selling at CHQ in clarifying the value of the subsidiary’s connections with host country 
institutions or partners is poorly understood (Forstenlechner & Mellahi, 2011; Geppert & 
Dorrenbacher, 2014). Third party descriptions of issues may be viewed as more legitimate than 
first person accounts for example (Inman et al., 2004). If the subsidiary’s own voice has lost 
impact or is perceived as inadequate issues may be sold through coalition building or local 
representations. Thus, the linkage legitimacy a subsidiary draws from the connections in its 
local environment can be critical for directing CHQ visible attention to key issues.  
The challenge of managing positive and negative CHQ attention through subsidiary legitimacy 
is therefore one that has been largely overlooked in extant research and the current study 
focused on this key question. Drawing from the literature on issue selling and organisational 
legitimacy, combined with our data analysis process, we identify specific forms of subsidiary 
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legitimacy, in the form of personal, consequential and visible. These forms of legitimacy may 
help in managing the quality and quantity of CHQ attention that a subsidiary receives. The 
following section considers the methodological underpinnings of this research.  
 
3. Methods 
An exploratory approach was considered appropriate given the relatively nascent development 
of current theory and research on how subsidiaries use specific forms of legitimacy to manage 
CHQ attention. Adopting a phenomenological perspective we employed qualitative methods to 
investigate subsidiary issue selling, with the subsidiary as the main unit of analysis. The size 
and the nature of the sample facilitates theoretical as opposed to numerical generalisations, with 
the former more suited to the goal of this research, which is to contribute to the development of 
new constructs by bringing two relatively distinct fields of research - in the form of issue selling 
and legitimacy - together in a new context (Gioia et al. 2013). This exploration exercises a case 
study approach, which is considered an appropriate tool for determining the early stage 
relationship between key variables (Gilbert et al. 2008). Qualitative case studies help 
researchers delve deep into complex matters, which are not wholly understood (Yin, 1994) and 
have been proposed as key methodological tools for investigating MNE activity (Birkinshaw et 
al. 2011; Pauwels & Matthyssens, 2004) and legitimacy (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). In 
designing the case study framework, Eisenhardt’s (1989) ‘theoretical sampling’ technique was 
used. Cases were selected based on their suitability for illuminating and extending our 
understanding of current theory. The sample comprised four U.S. MNE subsidiaries based in 
the medical device industry in the west of Ireland. Table 1 summarises the profiles of each of 
these cases.  
 
------------------------------------- > INSERT TABLE 1 HERE < ----------------------------------- 
 
U.S. MNEs in particular, operating in the medical device sector have dominated the flow of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ireland (Barry, 2007; Collings et al. 2010). Ireland has the 
highest concentration of medical device businesses anywhere in the world outside of the U.S. 
(IMDA 2015) and the western region is recognised globally as a leading medical device cluster 
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(Giblin & Ryan, 2012). The main sampling source for identifying suitable subsidiaries in this 
industry was the Industrial Development Agency’s (IDA Ireland)1 company database, while 
further sampling was carried out through media and company reports. A search identified 252 
medical device MNEs in Ireland, of which 29 were U.S. headquartered and based in the western 
region. Ten of these had received major investment in the last three years, and within this 
sample, four subsidiaries were willing to provide full access. To ensure that the data collected 
reflected genuine events rather than a priori judgments, only subsidiaries that had gained an 
extension to their operations in the three years preceding the study were considered. Due to the 
success of Ireland as a location in attracting higher value added activities over the past several 
decades (Begley et al. 2005), three of the case subsidiaries are now operating under regional 
management mandates (RMM) for the EU, which is a distinct type of mandate where local 
subsidiaries perform certain delegated CHQ functions for a given region (Alfoldi et al. 2012). 
Our research and data collection is based on investigating the actions and behaviours that 
preceded the attainment of RMM status from CHQ. At the time of this study, these subsidiaries 
had just been granted RMMs and questions were targeted towards unearthing specific 
antecedents that led to these.   
Semi-structured interviews with MNE subsidiary managers were chosen as the main method 
of data collection, as they are flexible enough to facilitate exploration of under-examined 
phenomena or constructs (King, 2004). Table 2 details the profiles of thirty semi-structured 
interviewees that were performed in total, from a time period of December 2011 to December 
2012 (seven interviews were held first in HEALTHCO2, followed by eight in MEDCO, six in 
CHEMCO and eight in PHARMCO respectively). Four of these interviews were carried out 
with a corporate executive from each CHQ in an attempt to triangulate subsidiary responses. 
These corporate executives were former managers at the subsidiary level but at the time of the 
interviews were operating out of CHQ. From an interpretive perspective, it was perceived as 
important to develop an understanding of the meaning behind the subsidiary responses, thus 
‘probing techniques’ were an important tool for this study (McCracken, 1988). Probes allow 
for depth and comprehension of the data obtained, as interviewees may use and incorporate 
words and their understanding of ideas in different ways (Berry, 2002; Gray, 2007). The 
interviews were conducted by the first author and were primarily conducted face to face at 
                                                      
1 IDA Ireland is the government agency in Ireland that is responsible for promoting and 
attracting FDI activities. 
2 Subsidiaries were given pseudonyms to provide anonymity. 
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company offices. Two interviews were carried out over phone. The interviews lasted 90 
minutes on average. Interviews were all recorded and transcribed verbatim to ensure data 
cleaning (Saunders et al. 2009). Most respondents were chosen according to ‘purposive 
sampling’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and obtained global roles, which added depth to the 
subsidiary candidates’ understanding of what CHQ valued. An interview was also undertaken 
with a single representative from IDA Ireland, who was identified by a number of subsidiaries 
as a key mediator in the CHQ-subsidiary relationship.  
 
------------------------------------- > INSERT TABLE 2 HERE < ---------------------------------------- 
 
Interpretation of the qualitative interview data wasWe approached the analysis of our data as 
an iterative concurrent process of constant comparison between data analysis and data 
collection over time. This recursive interplayinterchange between our rich data and emerging 
conceptual insights, that are were related to existing theories, facilitated the creation of new 
theoretical ideas (Doz, 2011; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Upon consulting the literature,Our 
research process is best viewed this research process was viewed as transitioning from an 
inductive to an ‘abductive’ fashion in that data and existing theory were juxtaposedcontrasted 
in tandem (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Gioia et al. 2013; Van Maanen et al. 2007). 
Therefore, instead ofrather than sticking rigorousidly stickingly to the theory we initially 
reviewed, for example theories around socialisation and the psychological contract, we 
consulted and introduced new theory, such as around the role of emotions, based on the 
formation of the problems we encountered in the data. Following, As Van Maanen suggests we 
recognise that good theory comes emerges from “engagement with problems” in the empirical 
world “but in the service of theorizing” (2007: 1149). This Our process of analysis represented 
signified a constant dialogue between the researchers and the emerging theory, with resulting 
in our theorising theoretical ideas being continuously refined as the analysis progressed (Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002). Our approach here closely resembles ‘matching’ or ‘fitting’ of data with theory 
that has been applied in other abductive studies (Figueira De-Lemos & Hadjikhani, 2014). 
Questions revolved around the subsidiary’s sources of legitimacy identified in the literature 
review, hence focusing on the way subsidiaries sold issues to CHQ, who sold these issues, how 
their relationships with other subsidiaries and local institutional actors affected this process. 
Given the importance of these issues, they were approached from different vantage points 
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throughout the interviews We followed the conventions of template analysis in. Responses were 
our coding. We coded according to the conventions of template analysis where the researcher 
produced a list of codes representing themes identified in the contextual data (King, 2004). The 
We then coded our data were then coded against this template. New with new codes being were 
added and a priori codes being were progressively redefined as the recursive process 
progressed. 
Drawing onConsistent with the traditions of qualitative analysis techniques, the modification 
and evolution of this template proceeded along three distinct paths (Gioia et al. 2013; Pratt, 
2009; Saunders et al. 2009). Firstly, each interview was transcribed each of our interviews and 
summarised sections of the data into key words. We initially focused on individual interviews, 
then for both interviews in each dyad, and finally across the dyads.  and large portions of data 
were effectively ‘summarised’ into key words. This initial ‘open coding’ resulted in a plethora 
of ‘first order codes’. These codes were based on the terminology used by interviewees. This 
was done initially for individual interviews in each case, then across interviews in each case 
and subsequently across cases.  We continued to re-read and analyse the transcripts to identify 
relationships between these first order codes and to ensure adherence to the response terms. In 
the second stage of our coding, we moved to In these initial stages, often termed ‘open coding’, 
a multitude of ‘first order codes’ were derived from the language informants used. Repeatedly 
listening to, reading, rereading and interpreting the transcripts to identify relations among these 
first order concepts ensured faithful adherence to the response terms. Secondly, ‘categorising’, 
and the development of ‘second order codes’. These second order codes reflected the 
development of  where categories were which we developed alongside the data in order to 
recogniseto reflect relationships, themes and patterns between other potential categories 
produced ‘second order codes’ (Saunders et al.  2009). These categories were derivedDeriving 
these categories involved integrating terms used by participants,  from terms that emerged from 
the data, terms used by participants and terms derived from existing extant literature (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008). At this stage categories These categories werebecame internally meaningful 
to the data while alsoas well as being externally meaningful to other categories (Saunders et al. 
2009). In this regard, theoreticalTheoretical sampling was used to help us in scrutinisinge the 
data for convergent concepts or quotes and their relationships with first order codes. Several 
overlapping categories were merged, grounded in theoretical language and related to what the 
theory was saying. Particular attention was given to the themes that ‘leaped out’ due to their 
relevance to the existing literature (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
Commented [DC1]: Need to add some examples here. 
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Thirdly, as the research reached a mature point, a process of ‘unitising’ was carried out, where 
relevant chunks of the data, in the form of rich quotes, were attached to these categories 
(Saunders et al. 2009). Constant comparison techniques were used to establish category 
commonalities and validate whether a theme was indeed a reportable finding. In this final stage, 
first and second order codes derived from the data, existing literature and emerging themes, 
were compared with what is known about legitimacy from previous research (Bitekine, 2011; 
Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zott & Huy, 2007). After each interview these 
themes were adapted incrementally, based on new information provided, and subsequently 
discussed with the next interviewee for validation and additional comment (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In keeping with other work on legitimacy (Ahlstrom et al. 2008), this study reviewed interview 
transcripts and notes carefully and meticulously until a defined group of subsidiary legitimacy 
dimensions that represented and summarised the data were identified. This form of selective 
coding resulted in aggregate dimensions or principal categories with an emphasis on 
recognising and developing an explanatory theory.  
For example, one subsidiary manager stated, “one of my colleagues got a university lecturer to 
do a talent management master-class”, while another stated, “if you want to impress the head 
office managers over there then you need a nice big rubber stamp with a big name that they all 
know … that will really turn them on”. We coded these statements as ‘representation from the 
local environment’ when selling issues which ultimately resulted in the grouping of these codes 
under the aggregate dimension of ‘linkage legitimacy’. This whole selective process was 
executed manually and guided meticulously by the research question and a number of 
‘structural signals’ (Dabos & Rousseau, 2004) or ‘synthesising concepts’ (Blumer, 1954) from 
the literature on subsidiary issue selling and legitimacy. Table 3 represents this categorical 
coding process in more depth.  
Credibility of qualitative research is based on construct validity, internal validity, external 
validity, and reliability (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Silverman, 2006). Construct validity was 
adhered to in the data collection phase by developing a detailed and comprehensive literature 
review, culminating in a coherent conceptualisation of the main research constructs, while 
allowing a clear chain of evidence for the reader in reconstructing the research process (Gibbert 
et al. 2008). Internal validity was established through ‘constant comparison’ techniques of 
within and cross-case analysis along with ‘pattern matching’ between relationships in current 
data and the previous literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Adherence to external validity was achieved 
in the form of analytical generalisation (Eisenhardt, 1989) by providing a clear rationale for the 
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case study selection and a reasoned appreciation for sampling choices (Cook & Campbell, 
1979). Reliability allows for replication of the study and it was ensured through recording all 
face-to-face interviews, carefully transcribing these tapes verbatim as well as presenting 
accurate extracts of data in the findings section (Gibbert et al. 2008). 
 
------------------------------------- > INSERT TABLE 3 HERE < ---------------------------------------- 
 
4. Findings 
Upon detailing responses from subsidiaries, it became clear that three of the four subsidiaries 
developed similar philosophies around the question, “how do we get more recognition for what 
we are doing well?” (Plant Manager HEALTHCO). There was general recognition among 
respondents that their subsidiaries were geographically isolated from CHQ. Respondents in 
these subsidiaries believed that it was important to start “selling the plant more, selling its 
achievements and making sure that awareness is out there” as CHQ cannot “see outside the 
[home] country and they do not understand” (Manufacturing Engineering Manager MEDCO). 
Hence, CHEMCO, MEDCO and HEALTHCO were all active sellers, albeit to varying degrees, 
within their respective MNEs. There was evidence of success in the form of positive CHQ 
attention in this regard through investment extensions. For example, MEDCO received a recent 
investment of over €7 million from its CHQ to build a customer innovation centre. At 
HEALTHCO, the subsidiary recently acquired a 50% extension to their plant, worth over €100 
million. CHEMCO recently built a new EU office facility worth €20 million in Ireland. 
PHARMCO initially received €25 million for the development of collaborative R&D projects 
across the MNE, however, after the interviewing process was carried out this funding was 
retracted by the CHQ, which ultimately resulted in a loss of R&D functionality to the 
PHARMCO subsidiary. The following sections detail the specific forms of legitimacy that 
these subsidiaries drew upon to attract positive CHQ attention and ultimately minimise 
negative CHQ attention.  
 
4.1 Attracting Supportive Attention through Personal Legitimacy  
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Subsidiary respondents were keenly aware of the effects that the personal legitimacy of key 
individuals had on attracting positive CHQ attention. PHARMCO and CHEMCO relied on 
selling issues through the personal legitimacy of key individuals who had global roles operating 
out of the subsidiary. This provided them with external “branches of influence”. The inherent 
external reporting lines associated with these roles provided exposure to avenues of 
engagement with executives at CHQ. CHEMCO had developed global roles that obliged 
external reporting lines to CHQ, but their issue selling was largely channelled through a single 
source in the form of their direct informal relationship with the CEO. As the VP of Regulatory 
Affairs at CHEMCO acknowledged “we all have our channels of influence in terms of through 
R&D, operations etc. but essentially our CEO or anyone who influences him we need to be 
connected to”. For example, CHEMCO’s Plant Manager illustrated how he used his personal 
legitimacy in this capacity saying; 
One of the things that I do a lot with our CEO is that I constantly have the antenna 
up in here in Europe…I have never had corporate refuse to look at something that 
I would have recommended 
                                                                        (VP of European Operations CHEMCO).  
 
The Senior QA Director at PHARMCO remarked that he has regularly been assigned to help 
integrate acquisitions across the MNE and felt that this role could help him create more support 
from CHQ stating, “the more people you have in higher positions the more influence you can 
have”. Despite this example, we found little evidence to suggest that PHARMCO had 
attempted to leverage the personal legitimacy of key individual sellers to any great degree. 
CHEMCO were only beginning to acknowledge the value of this approach as they were going 
through a growth period taking on further global roles and investment. Appositely, instead of 
relying solely on personal legitimacy of those in global roles in the subsidiary HEALTHCO 
and MEDCO focused on what appears to be a more advanced approach. To a degree these 
subsidiaries have co-opted the MNE with individuals who have migrated to the CHQ, selling 
issues based on their personal legitimacy. “Having a couple of friends in corporate” (Plant 
Manager HEALTHCO) was central to HEALTHCO & MEDCO’s selling approaches. 
Individual sellers essentially acted as legitimacy brokers, who legitimised key issues at CHQ 
on behalf of the subsidiary. The two corporate representatives we interviewed at these 
subsidiaries were both former subsidiary managers now operating out of the CHQ. As the Plant 
Manager at HEALTHCO explained, “the Global Director of Engineering came from [Ireland] 
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too, and the Vice President for overall R&D came from here so we have been able to populate 
the corporation’s structure”. This manager described an example of when they lost functional 
expertise and how this has changed due to having individuals with more personal legitimacy;  
We probably had the wrong person leading that function, they were not capable of 
having the credibility and potential competency to win more of that functionality, 
that has changed; now we have people who are considered very capable, so we are 
all of a sudden now discussing whether there is European roles that we could locate 
in [the subsidiary].  
 
Respondents at MEDCO believed their CHQ did not assess issues based on the subsidiary itself 
but instead more specifically “they [CHQ] give things to the person” (HR Manager). The 
Senior HR Manager at MEDCO explained how he used his own personal legitimacy through 
his constant “willingness to do a bit of work” and as a result “your name gets out there as 
somebody who might have an interest in the subject matter or has something to say or might 
do a bit of work on the project, which often I find is the leading influence as to whether you 
will be on the project or not”. MEDCO respondents added that they had become “talent 
exporters” and that they too had “populated” the corporate structure with individuals who were 
now operating out of CHQ and were able to discreetly “push the subsidiary’s agenda” (Senior 
HR Manager MEDCO). The quote below highlights this point;  
When corporate has looked for new leaders, the best people have probably come 
from [the subsidiary], the former head of [the subsidiary] would have taken the 
next job up in the corporation and he would have taken the next job up again and 
the next job after that and his predecessor would have kept following him … it is 
a huge advantage to us, that person knows us well, knows our capability, and can 
speak for us as he is coming from a position of knowledge when they are 
considering our site. When we are three thousand miles away that is important to 
have somebody who knows our capability and can influence at that level who 
knows what our strengths are and what our aims are 
(Senior HR Manager MEDCO). 
 
The corporate representative at HEALTHCO added (VP of R&D);  
The Irish contacts have helped. Up until seven or eight years ago we did not move 
people around like they are now and I was certainly the first to move around going 
to the U.S…the credibility is critical, without that credibility and some level of 
sponsorship from corporate; decisions will not go their way.  
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Respondents at HEALTHCO reinforced the significance of individual sellers by emphasising 
the importance of “walking the corporate corridors” and the risks of “being out of sight out of 
mind” at corporate (Global Marketing Manager HEALTHCO) as it allows for hearing what 
happens on the “corporate grapevine” (HR Manager MEDCO). The IDA Ireland Manager 
added, “for us trying to win business we are always trying to find Irish connections in any 
company, it is huge”. However, the corporate respondent at MEDCO, who is Irish, highlights 
the risks involved in populating the corporate structure by stating, “you cannot be seen to be 
wearing the green jersey3 all the time and I would never push to bring a product in to [the 
subsidiary] that does not make sense”. These risks are outlined further in the section on 
negative attention. 
The preceding section illustrates that the personal legitimacy of key individuals at the 
subsidiary can be an effective tool to draw upon when selling issues. This may be done through 
advanced approaches of populating the CHQ with individuals who will push the subsidiary’s 
agenda or basic means of leveraging external reporting roles residing out of the subsidiary. 
Table 3 presents some ‘power quotes’ (Corley & Gioia, 2004) or ‘proof quotes’ (Pratt, 2008) 
on how the personal legitimacy of key individuals at the subsidiary was used to direct CHQ 
supportive attention to critical issues.  
 
------------------------------------- > INSERT TABLE 4 HERE < ---------------------------------------- 
 
4.2 Attracting Relative Attention through Consequential Legitimacy  
Despite the fact internal collaboration between subsidiaries was promoted by CHQ in all four 
cases, subsidiaries realised that they were ultimately competing for relative attention with peer 
subsidiaries and felt obliged to partake in issue selling. When selling issues these subsidiaries 
alluded to coopetition activities where competitive moves of establishing bases of comparison 
with other peer subsidiaries and collaborative moves of transferring best practices internally 
were used. This philosophy is reflected in the following responses; “making the playing field 
more advantageous” (Global Marketing Manager HEALTHCO) by emphasising “things to 
                                                      
3 This is a colloquial term referring to representing the Irish cause.  
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make us stand out internally” (Engineering Manager PHARMCO) can promote “healthy 
internal competition” (VP of Global Vascular Operations MEDCO). Subsidiary respondents 
believed that when selling issues vis-à-vis peer sites they needed to reinforce their track record 
by referring to their capabilities and achievements. PHARMCO had a very competitive internal 
culture in that subsidiaries were assessed in a league system based on key process indicators 
(KPIs). They highlighted that “you cannot be down at the bottom for too long” (R&D 
Sustaining Manager). HEALTHCO’s Plant Manager alluded to the way their subsidiary 
managed the fallout when “things go wrong” and that their peers tended to have adverse 
financial surprises over the years. MEDCO respondents reiterated this point stating, “from 
some initiatives some plants would say they have certain things done but when you get down 
deep they do not have it done at all so there can be an element of talking it up…for example 
the plant in the U.S. has had FDA [(The U.S.) Food and Drug Administration] issues so they 
are unlikely to get a new product” (Manufacturing Engineering Manager MEDCO). 
Respondents emphasised that the actual achievement of a consistent track record was important 
but the way in which subsidiaries created a narrative around this consistency was more 
significant. HEALTHCO respondents believed that “hammering home” their achievements to 
CHQ and “telling a story” around these achievements when CHQ visited the subsidiary was 
key (Plant Manager). Respondents maintained that, “it is all about creating a solid reputation 
that you can achieve and you are successful and selling that back to the parent company so that 
you can bring that and show your successes” (Manufacturing Engineering Manager MEDCO). 
Subsidiary respondents believed that articulating and promoting this as a clear and consistent 
message to CHQ over time allowed them to control the image of their subsidiary as positive 
and reinforcing relative to peers. For example, “you want them [CHQ] to say this is what they 
have done in the past, they have always brought it in on time, they have always brought it in 
on budget, taken cost out of it and they have always produced a very good product” (R&D 
Sustaining Manager PHARMCO). The Senior Manufacturing Director at MEDCO added, “we 
always refer to our achievements and we communicate them back to HQ … we do not sell 
ourselves as a low cost site, we say bring your worst problem here and we will fix it for you”. 
Best practice sharing allowed subsidiaries to draw on consequential legitimacy when selling 
issues, and MEDCO in particular positioned itself as a forerunner in establishing and sharing 
best practices. MEDCO shared practices with other subsidiaries in a way that they were ‘seen’ 
by corporate to be ‘taking the lead’ which helped when drawing attention to issues. The 
following quotes are illustrative;  
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Trying to be at the forefront to bring change and then be a benchmark for other 
plants to come and see what we can do. All of this supports when decisions are 
being made where [CHQ] are going to invest the next project in  
(Manufacturing Engineering Manager MEDCO). 
 
 [CHQ] encourages best practice sharing so much that people are typically 
applauded for coming out and coming up with the great idea first, so the 
competitive idea would be for people to come up with that great idea first and then 
be competitive and share it  
(Plant Manager PHARMCO). 
 
The Senior HR Manager at MEDCO described the importance of being a best practice exporter, 
but indicated that they are “not afraid to steal with pride”. An important extension to this 
argument was the fact that MEDCO in particular had achieved a status of becoming an 
“initiative exporter” (Senior HR Manager MEDCO). The Manufacturing Engineering Manager 
at MEDCO gives an example of an issue relating to cultural diversity that they led;  
We got a national award for it [a diversity programme] and then this diversity 
inclusion came on board and obviously it was discussed at a bigger window and the 
idea became how can we expand that out a little bit more to incorporate the whole. 
Now our company is very much focused in markets in the Asian development 
countries like China and India so being culturally diverse is important, especially if 
you want to bring products into those markets so that you are incorporating the needs 
of the country. 
 
Subsidiaries furthermore developed RKT activities. For instance, CHEMCO respondents 
described an instance where they had developed a best practice in accounting and how they 
leveraged this to attract relative attention to future issues. The Director of Engineering at 
CHEMCO notes;  
When I joined here most of the technology transfer was coming from the U.S. to 
here. What the team and I have succeeded in doing is that we have reversed that 
trend so now we are becoming the experts and the guys in the U.S. are coming to 
us and asking us for direction and guidance and the flow has shifted in that there is 
more coming from Ireland across to the U.S. now.  
 
Interestingly, respondents in CHEMCO went on to explain that they had been strategically 
targeting an issue that their CHQ did not know much about so that they could promote the 
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subsidiary’s achievement and eventually share their knowledge with CHQ (see Table 4). As 
the PHARMCO Plant Manager added, “we talk about if the company is big into diversity or 
employee development so we would want to make sure that we hit on those points to show 
how this site is supporting the overall strategy”. Ultimately, HEALTHCO and MEDCO were 
more strategic in their relative selling approaches. CHEMCO were starting to develop more 
advanced approaches and although PHARMCO respondents acknowledged the importance of 
relative selling, they did not actively participate in this to the same degree as other subsidiaries. 
Table 4 presents additional supporting quotations on how subsidiaries used their consequential 
legitimacy to direct CHQ relative attention to key issues. 
 
------------------------------------- > INSERT TABLE 5 HERE < ---------------------------------------- 
 
4.3 Attracting Visible Attention through Linkage Legitimacy  
The legitimate linkages that subsidiaries enjoyed in their local environment revolved around 
the structure of the local medical devices cluster and the specific industry itself. This local 
context facilitated the subsidiaries in attracting visible attention from CHQ. Intense 
collaboration and interaction in the local environment has created “a very tight network, 
between multinationals, indigenous companies who are supporting us, between multinationals 
and academia, with the government” (VP of Global Vascular Operations MEDCO). “The 
corporation see Ireland as being pro-business, see the management team as being connected to 
that pro-business network and that is what you have to keep going” (VP of European 
Operations CHEMCO).  
Subsidiary respondents identified political endorsements as one of the main sources of linkage 
legitimacy for directing CHQ visible attention to important issues. Respondents referred to the 
impact of their relationship with certain political figures and how they had used this to their 
advantage. They cited an example of the opening of a new facility and how they managed to 
use their political connections in order to “stroke the corporate ego” (VP European Operations 
CHEMCO) by having the Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) open the facility. As noted by the 
Director of Engineering at CHEMCO, “when you talk to some of corporate that were over here 
they equate that to meeting [The U.S. President], so that is how huge it is, that is how big they 
see it, so the likes of [Ireland’s Prime Minister] coming down here, opening the facility 
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spending time with the owner, that is very important”. This view was reinforced by the HR 
Manager at MEDCO, “for someone that is the President of a company and for him to meet 
what he calls the President of a country…it is a nice one”.  HEALTHCO respondents also 
pointed to the example where the Irish Prime Minister had visited the CHQ in the U.S to thank 
them for investing more in the subsidiary and the impact this had. The following quote 
illustrates the extent to which these connections can be used to legitimate issues;  
It is a massive deal. There is a new CEO appointed in the last year so we have invited 
him over a lot. Previously to him we had his boss over and the board of directors, 
we would get the [Prime Minister] down, we opened the new road from Shannon to 
Gort, got that open for them so this is a very big deal for them and it is seen as a 
massive opportunity. The road was two weeks away from being open but they just 
got [police] escort at the time. This is a symbol of what we will do to get [CHQ] here
  
                                                                                                             (HR Manager MEDCO).  
 
Subsidiary respondents also cited examples where IDA Ireland provided a nimble link to CHQ 
that other subsidiaries internally in the MNE did not appear to have ready access to. For 
example, PHARMCO’s R&D Sustaining Manager was positive about the advantages IDA 
Ireland had provided to their site especially in terms of “packing a punch” with corporate 
officials in that, “they go out and have been to our corporate offices and meet key people within 
the organisation on a regular basis”. HEALTHCO’s corporate contact added, “when you have 
a state authority like that getting in behind you and supporting you, you can cut through barriers 
that may arise”.  
This perspective was reinforced by the interviewee from IDA Ireland who stated;  
When we meet new companies…they are like kids, senior executives who literally 
act like they would not be able to find their way across the road and we set 
everything in place...How we sell and market to new companies for example is that 
we bring them around and show them other companies that are here…IDA Ireland 
also help get companies a voice at senior government. 
                                        (Manager IDA Ireland). 
HEALTHCO aligned an issue they were trying to sell to CHQ with a reputable consulting firm 
where the Director of Strategic Planning & Infrastructure stated, “if you want to impress the 
head office managers over there then you need a nice big rubber stamp with a big name that 
they all know, Deloitte or CapGemini and that will really turn them on”. MEDCO and 
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HEALTHCO in particular cited specific examples where they had used linkages to universities 
to help sell issues to CHQ. In HEALTHCO, the New Product Development Manager revealed 
that they design particular issues and products in conjunction with design schools and 
subsequently sell these links internally. The HR Manager in MEDCO emphasised to CHQ that 
their issues were aligned with “academic research” and cited a particular example when they 
sought help from a globally renowned university Professor to present on talent management, 
an issue they knew their new CEO was “hot on”; 
For example, one of my colleagues got a university lecturer to do a talent 
management master-class and that definitely promoted his reputation up the ranks 
because he is adding a lot more value than someone who is sitting there [passively]. 
 
  
Interestingly, PHARMCO’s Plant Manager, a U.S. Expatriate, acknowledged how the 
subsidiary’s interaction with local universities is perceived from a U.S. managerial standpoint 
stating; 
We would definitely interact with local institutions typically more so here than in 
the U.S....having a number of educational institutions around makes the company 
very aware of that and that is probably one of the reasons why there was such a focus 
here. 
The response from MEDCO’s CHQ representative below reinforces this belief;  
 
Corporate, by any distance, they would not have that same level of connection and I 
have heard it commented on, ‘it is great that you guys can have access to 
government…So do corporate recognise it? Yes. Are they impressed by it? 
Absolutely yes 
                                                                          (VP of Global Vascular Operations MEDCO). 
 
These responses illustrate that the linkage legitimacy subsidiaries receive from connections in 
their local environment can help in directing CHQ visible attention to key issues. Table 5 
presents a summary of relevant reinforcing quotations. In the next section, we consider the 
implications of attracting negative CHQ attention.  
 
------------------------------------- > INSERT TABLE 6 HERE < ---------------------------------------- 
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4.4 Managing Negative CHQ Attention  
When selling issues to CHQ, it became clear that some subsidiaries occasionally struggled with 
the boundaries of when to stop or hold back, as they wrestled with understanding what 
constituted overselling and how this could result in negative CHQ attention. Both HEALTHCO 
and MEDCO have attracted varying degrees of negative attention from CHQ as they have 
oversold issues, taking on too much investment and subsequently failing to deliver on 
‘unrealistic expectations’ from CHQ. As HEALTHCO’s Global Marketing Manager noted, “if 
you are winning loads of investment then people look positively on you as a plant but the 
negatives of that are that you have to deliver on it”. The corporate respondent at HEALTHCO 
(VP of R&D) reinforced these concerns by stating; 
We [CHQ] have introduced new products and they [the subsidiary] have struggled, 
and have had a severe challenge in keeping up with the demand and that is 
tarnishing their credibility. They need to get on top of it and they need to put it 
right otherwise people will be reluctant to make significant future 
investments…The problem is there is so much going on there…and they are just 
struggling right now.  
 
Respondents at CHEMCO also alluded to their latest corporate investment and the fact it was 
so high profile that it may put pressure on them to deliver on unrealistic expectations from 
CHQ. Unlike the situation at HEALTHCO, they have yet to reach a point where their results 
are producing negative effects. Hence, CHEMCO’s rapid success is likely to bring negative 
attention if not managed effectively and the R&D Manager acknowledges this risk;  
You walk in and you see the building here with $20 million invested…somebody 
has to pay the mortgage on it, by virtue of the fact that we are here…We have 
invested in a lot of equipment and a lot of people so the expectation is that we 
perform and we asked for it so we got it.   
  
In relation to personal legitimacy, HEALTHCO respondents in particular pointed to examples 
where they have “overpopulated” the CHQ with subsidiary individuals and consequently 
experienced resentment and negative attention from CHQ. HEALTHCO in particular appear 
to have become extremely forceful in their selling approaches, which has affected their 
legitimacy. HEALTHCO’s Plant Manager, for example, was forceful in promoting what he 
called “covert ways of making the plant more attractive” by attempting to deploy those 
subsidiary individuals with higher perceived personal legitimacy in key areas that would allow 
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them to interact regularly with CHQ officials and build more support. This covert behaviour 
appears to have resulted in negative attention from CHQ in the form of an inpatriation4 
assignment for this particular subsidiary manager. Since the current study ended, 
HEALTHCO’s Plant Manager has been relocated to the CHQ and has been replaced with an 
expatriate from CHQ. The IDA Ireland Manager reinforced the effect this may have on the 
HEALTHCO subsidiary by stating; “it is a huge loss…it is worrying for us when we see a 
company like [HEALTHCO] has now got an American person who is running the Irish 
operation”. 
The more experienced managers in HEALTHCO (tenure wise) appeared accustomed to acting 
without CHQ’s knowledge in an attempt to avoid CHQ dismissing certain issues, as they 
believe “dealing with head office at times can be difficult…sometimes they are too restrictive 
on what you can do so you have to find ways around that” (Director of Strategic Planning & 
Infrastructure HEALTHCO). This has resulted in negative attention however. For example, 
upon discovering the acquisition of new machinery at the HEALTHCO subsidiary without 
their consent, CHQ reacted negatively and “changed reporting lines” in order to limit the plants 
activities. One manager highlights that there were “serious confrontations between this side of 
the Atlantic and the parent company…so they now began to get their own back on us” (Director 
of Strategic Planning & Infrastructure HEALTHCO). Hence, HEALTHCO’s legitimacy has 
been significantly affected, as they have been overly aggressive in their selling techniques and 
have failed to reach CHQ expectations. 
Respondents at MEDCO expressed similar concerns but appear to have managed potential 
negative CHQ attention more effectively. The Director of R&D believed that “once you build 
a good reputation it is important that you do not keep talking about yourself all the time, as 
being greedy can be a destructive strategy”. Respondents were conscious that they were 
resented internally owing to their perceived over selling, asserting, “there definitely is 
resentment from some sites where we have taken their business…I felt it at a personal 
level…they were resentful of Irish people in general because they saw us as responsible for the 
demise of their manufacturing site” resulting in “a lot of bad blood between subsidiaries 
internally” (HR Manager MEDCO). In contrast, PHARMCO respondents believed that they 
needed to get more involved in selling issues at CHQ, as they felt they were not effective enough 
                                                      
4 Inpatriation involves the transfer of a subsidiary employee to the CHQ on temporary or 
permanent basis (see Collings et al. 2010 for a discussion). 
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at selling internally and hence never captured any real positive attention. Interestingly for 
PHARMCO, corporate visits represented “uncomfortable attention” (Plant Manager 
PHARMCO) as it is “very difficult to attract executives to the subsidiary unless there is a big 
problem” (R&D Sustaining Manager). Tellingly, after this study concluded, PHARMCO 
suffered from an R&D investment being removed by CHQ, signalling this negative attention. 
The Senior QA Manager at PHARMCO believed that “we are not great at promoting ourselves”, 
whereas the Engineering Manager stated that it was difficult to get CHQ to see the subsidiary’s 
perspective and “trying to force that agenda does not really work”. The quote below reinforces 
these views;  
 
We did not get a lot of attention last year but that is a good thing…as you are 
going to get a lot of attention if things are not going well, if you are not hitting 
your targets or there are quality problems well then you are going to get an awful 
lot of uncomfortable attention 
                                                                                          (Plant Manager PHARMCO). 
 
The IDA Ireland Manager sums up the tentative nature of potentially attracting negative 
attention by stating that subsidiary managers “have to be so careful and politically astute within 
their organisations that they do not overly promote Ireland every single time...you cannot be 
seen as being too parochial”.   
The above findings illustrate how negative CHQ attention can result in unrealistic expectations 
or demands from CHQ, inpatriation assignments, changed reporting lines or mandate removal 
for subsidiaries being key examples. Overall, these findings illustrate how subsidiaries take an 
active interest in the amount of internal selling they convey to CHQ and the way their different 
forms of legitimacy attract specific types of attention.  
 
5. Discussion & conclusion 
The main contribution of this research is in illustrating how subsidiary issue selling draws on 
different forms of legitimacy to capture specific types of positive CHQ attention while 
attempting to limit or minimise negative CHQ attention. We develop the attention-based view 
of the MNE (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a; Bouquet et al. 2015) 
by drawing on two distinct but interrelated fields of work that have not previously been 
integrated, namely; subsidiary issue selling (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Ling et al. 2005) and 
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organisational legitimacy (Bitekine, 2011; Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; Zott & 
Huy, 2007). We identify specific forms of subsidiary legitimacy and explicate how each of 
these attracts positive CHQ attention, in the form of personal legitimacy of key individuals at 
the subsidiary (supportive attention), consequential legitimacy vis-à-vis peer subsidiaries 
(relative attention) and linkage legitimacy from the subsidiary’s local environment (visible 
attention). Furthermore, our research provides empirical insights on negative CHQ attention 
by illustrating that subsidiaries, which did not align their issue-selling endeavours with 
particular forms of legitimacy, ultimately attracted negative attention from CHQ. These 
arguments extend our understanding of the CHQ-subsidiary relationship by illuminating how 
subsidiary legitimacy can be used to balance the double-edged sword of positive and negative 
CHQ attention. Ultimately our findings add insight to three different strands of literature; issue 
selling, legitimacy, and attention, all of which are detailed in the below subsections.  
5.1 Subsidiary Issue-Selling Roles  
We have identified four particular types of subsidiary issue-selling roles, and have categorised 
these as; passive citizens, corporate aggressors, attention champions, and budding stars. Two 
dimensions define the issue-selling roles; the level of legitimacy the subsidiary possesses and 
the amount of attention the subsidiary receives. High attention can be either positive or negative 
while low attention equates to indifference or isolation from CHQ. To demonstrate this, we 
look to our examination of PHARMCO, CHEMCO, HEALTHCO, and MEDCO. Figure 1 
presents a typology of these roles and demonstrates how subsidiaries may use their legitimacy 
to attract CHQ attention to key issues.  
PHARMCO is an example of a ‘passive citizen’ with no explicit selling strategy. As a result, 
they incur low legitimacy and therefore receive limited or no attention, either positive or 
negative from CHQ. Subsidiaries that adhere to this role are content with indifference or 
isolation from CHQ as they are apprehensive of an attempt to sell too much, fearing negative 
attention that it may generate. HEALTHCO, on the other hand, fit the categorisation of a 
‘corporate aggressor’. These subsidiaries are forceful sellers and frequently oversell to CHQ, 
often acting in covert ways. Respondents argued that it was better to force the corporate agenda 
and subsequently ‘seek forgiveness rather than permission’. As a result, corporate aggressors 
receive significant CHQ attention, most of which is negative due to CHQ’s perception of 
illegitimate selling behaviour. 
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CHEMCO is illustrative of a ‘budding star’, at an early stage of development. Budding stars 
maintain a medium to high degree of legitimacy but are not equally matched in regards to 
attention. However, budding star subsidiaries are often characterised by entering a growth 
phase. As the subsidiary enters a period of growth, they have the potential to cultivate further 
positive attention. Conversely, these roles are often the most precarious. As budding stars 
attempt to sell more they risk attracting negative attention by becoming illegitimate corporate 
aggressors. CHEMCO, for example, is in a growth phase, and would benefit from a measured 
selling approach, as opposed to HEALTHCO, which oversold issues. However, if CHEMCO 
continue to sell issues commensurate to their legitimacy they may attract further positive 
attention and become attention champions over time. 
Finally, MEDCO is illustrative of an ‘attention champion’ as the subsidiary has a high degree 
of legitimacy and attracts mostly high levels of positive CHQ attention. Attention champions 
rely heavily on their legitimacy when selling issues. Further, they understand what issues to 
sell, when to sell them, how to sell them and who to target. These subsidiaries may occasionally 
attract negative attention, but learn how to overcome or avoid further negative interactions. 
Ultimately, attention champions manage to balance the double-edged sword of negative and 
positive CHQ attention over time.  
 
------------------------------------- > INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE < ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
5.2 Subsidiary Legitimacy in Issue Selling  
This study contributes to current thinking on how legitimacy is actively managed in the MNE. 
Despite the fact that legitimacy has been highlighted as a critical factor in the attainment of 
valuable resources, and even survival over time, studies have failed to apply these 
understandings at the subsidiary level. We address Kostova et al’s (2008) call for a nuanced 
understanding of how legitimacy is garnered and leveraged, particularly through political 
interactions at the CHQ-subsidiary interface. We found that issues that draw on the personal 
legitimacy of key individuals at the subsidiary gain supportive attention from CHQ. Subsidiary 
behaviour in this regard was consistent with arguments that a manager’s willingness to 
endeavour difficult projects other managers will not endure can gain supportive attention 
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(Barsoux & Bouquet, 2013). An interesting finding from our study is that subsidiaries 
deliberately seek to ‘populate the CHQ’, through ‘talent exporting’ strategies placing former 
subsidiary employees in key positions. They subsequently used the personal legitimacy of 
‘sellers’, or what we call ‘legitimacy brokers’, to legitimise issues and push the subsidiary’s 
agenda at CHQ. Hence, issues expressed by legitimate individuals with high levels of relational 
and strategic knowledge are likely to be considered more credible and may attract supportive 
attention from CHQ. We identify ‘populating the corporate structure’ with ‘subsidiary 
champions’ (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005) as a specific issue-selling move that has not been 
explicitly considered previously. This builds on Bouquet & Birkinshaw’s (2008b) theorisation 
on the ‘cooptation’ of subsidiary ‘elites’ across the MNE or Harzing’s (2002) ‘pollination’ 
approach. This finding challenges the perspective that expatriates carry more weight in 
attracting CHQ attention than host country managers (Plourde et al. 2014). The success of 
subsidiary issue selling in the MNE is not based on subsidiary characteristics alone, but more 
specifically, the personal legitimacy of subsidiary ‘sellers’ and the knowledge they have 
regarding the corporate agenda are key explanatory variables.  
Our research also provides insights on how subsidiaries use consequential legitimacy to attract 
CHQ relative attention vis-à-vis peer subsidiaries (Becker-Ritterspach & Dorrenbacher 2011; 
Luo, 2005; Molloy & Delany, 1998). We show that intra firm dynamics between subsidiaries 
within the MNE provide a context where subsidiaries can use consequential legitimacy to direct 
CHQ relative attention to critical issues. Subsidiary issue selling sought to establish a base of 
comparison with other internal units or share best practices with these peers in order to be seen 
as legitimate. When selling issues, subsidiaries placed value on optimising their distinctiveness 
vis-à-vis peer units. This involved transmission of a consistent message to CHQ regarding the 
issues being sold, the subsidiary’s track record and capabilities. Emphasis on a record of 
accomplishment may instil confidence that the subsidiary is a reliable and trustworthy actor 
within the MNE (Ambos et al. 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b). MEDCO took the lead 
in sharing best practices across the MNE in the form of exporting initiatives, thus enhancing 
its issue-selling abilities by drawing on the resulting consequential legitimacy. Our study 
highlights how peer interactions, both competitive and collaborative, generate consequential 
legitimacy, which can be used to direct CHQ relative attention to key subsidiary issues.  
Our findings advance the literature on subsidiary issue selling by demonstrating how 
subsidiaries trade on legitimate linkages of key institutional bodies in the local environment 
(Baum & Oliver, 1991; Bitekine, 2011; Suchman, 1995; Morgan & Kristensen, 2006; Zott & 
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Huy, 2007). More specifically, subsidiaries in our study were highly involved in associating 
themselves with legitimate actors in the local environment and reinforcing linkages to direct 
CHQ visible attention to key issues. This builds on Tregaskis’ (2003) argument that the 
knowledge generated from the subsidiary’s local networks may be perceived by CHQ as more 
legitimate than intra-organisational linkages. However, we develop this perspective by 
demonstrating that these connections are of little relevance to the subsidiary unless the 
subsidiary is socially and politically adept in incorporating them into selling issues at CHQ. 
We depict subsidiary issue-selling moves, such as coalition building and representation, which 
draw on legitimacy they receive from links to political endorsements, universities and IDA 
Ireland in particular as key. We therefore contribute to an advanced perspective of subsidiary 
issue selling by showing that the amount of positive attention a subsidiary issue receives is not 
based on the existence of these linkages alone. Rather, it depends on the capability of 
subsidiaries to surface and demonstrate these legitimate connections at CHQ. As Molloy & 
Delany argue, “political skill in influencing the parent is essential” (1998: 33) but we add that 
this requires an ability to build legitimate relationships on an ongoing basis and subsequently 
leverage these, as they may be perceived more legitimate than first person accounts (Inman et 
al., 2004). 
5.3 Managing Positive and Negative CHQ Attention 
This study also enhances our understanding of the attention perspective of the MNE (Ambos 
& Birkinshaw, 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a; Bouquet et al. 2015) by considering how 
subsidiaries can use their legitimacy to manage positive and negative CHQ attention. We have 
detailed how subsidiary legitimacy contributes to attracting positive CHQ attention, which is 
generally characterised by CHQ value creating activities, such as increased investment, 
mandate extensions or promotions for subsidiary management. More importantly, our study 
provides insightful contributions to understanding negative CHQ attention. Despite calls for a 
greater consideration of what negative CHQ attention entails we know of little or no empirical 
work in this area (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a). Our findings illuminate the ‘dark side’ (Eden 
& Lenway, 2001) of CHQ attention, depicting it as a double-edged sword that could 
paradoxically disadvantage the subsidiary if it does not align its issue selling with the 
aforementioned forms of legitimacy. We define negative CHQ attention as direct or indirect 
interventions from CHQ that destroy value at the subsidiary level. Direct negative CHQ 
attention occurs when CHQ perceives the subsidiary as acting illegitimately and not in line 
with the overall strategic agenda. Direct negative attention from CHQ in our study includes 
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changing reporting lines, inpatriation assignment of covert subsidiary managers, and in the 
extreme form, mandate removal.  
Interestingly, we show that negative CHQ attention can indirectly suffocate the subsidiary by 
providing excessive support to successful subsidiaries. We believe that indirect negative 
attention is more nuanced and difficult for CHQ to identify or manage, as the CHQ suffers 
from certain attention biases (Bouquet et al. 2016). We argue that indirect negative attention 
essentially equates to too much attention from CHQ and resembles what Bouquet et al (2015) 
call ‘hyperattention’. In our study, CHQ placed unrealistic expectations or demands on 
subsidiaries that had successfully gained investment, and when subsequent performance did 
not reach expected heights, the subsidiary’s legitimacy was affected. Indirect negative attention 
may therefore destroy value for successful subsidiaries even though the CHQ has good 
intentions in their attempt to add value and support the subsidiary. These arguments build on 
Bouquet et al’s (2009) arguments by demonstrating that as CHQ devotes further international 
attention to successful subsidiaries, these executives develop a desire for additional information 
and overcommit themselves to certain issues thus suffocating those subsidiaries.  
 
We illustrate that subsidiaries which did not use their legitimacy effectively suffered from too 
little CHQ attention, while those subsidiaries that oversold or were ‘politically naïve’ in selling 
issues attract negative attention from CHQ. We concur with Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), 
demonstrating that there can be a ‘double-edge’ to over promoting the success of an 
organisation, as subsidiaries that oversold issues were perceived by CHQ as self-serving in 
nature. Subsidiaries in this respect confronted a ‘self-promoters paradox’; the more the 
subsidiary sells certain issues the more suspicion the CHQ may develop (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990). Therefore, attracting attention can be a dangerous game. Subsidiaries need to balance a 
healthy equilibrium of vigilant and proactive issue selling by drawing on different forms of 
legitimacy.  
 
Managing CHQ attention is ultimately a dynamic process where subsidiaries need to learn 
through repeated interaction with key corporate executives (Howard-Greenville, 2007). A 
focus on quality and quantity of CHQ attention should be the key concern for subsidiaries, as 
opposed to garnering attention from CHQ in general. This is a point often overlooked in extant 
research in the area. Subsidiaries should not focus solely on selling issues internally, however, 
“there is a give and take so you have to know what battles to fight in, the ones you really believe 
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in, and there are others you have to let go, you cannot win them all you have got to let them 
[CHQ] win some too” (Global Marketing Manager HEALTHCO). Legitimacy in particular 
may provide subsidiaries with a lens to consider the issues that are valued at CHQ and when it 
is wise to sell. Selling subsidiary issues through legitimacy may also ease the impossible burden 
on CHQ to identify, understand and process the vast array of diverse opportunities. This may 
be accomplished by placing the onus on the subsidiary to frame issues in such a way that CHQ 
will recognise promptly. International attention from the CHQ perspective can be cumbersome 
and exerts significant burdens on corporate executives, taking attention away from other 
strategic imperatives (Bouquet et al, 2009; Bouquet et al. 2015). We show that subsidiary actors 
believed their CHQ could not fully understand every issue at the subsidiary level and therefore 
they had to take deliberate steps to manage CHQ attention. Ultimately, if a subsidiary’s issues 
are not closely aligned with a set of legitimating forms specific to the subsidiary then they risk 
mismanaging the double-edge sword of CHQ attention. 
In acknowledging several limitations of the current study we also suggest avenues for future 
research. Firstly, a case study approach may limit the generalisability of the study, however our 
aim was not to generalise but to develop theory. The decision to focus the study on U.S. based 
subsidiaries was made for several reasons. From a positive perspective, a single host country 
design controls for major variations in institutional settings. These include national institutions, 
labour markets and university-firm linkages that are likely to have an important effect on the 
process and mechanisms through which knowledge travels (Frost, 2002). Employing a single 
FDI home country and a single host country helps control for the factors particular to the home 
and host countries (e.g. cultural political, social and economic factors). A further limitation in 
this regard is that the research was effectively carried out as a ‘snapshot’ (Saunders et al. 2009) 
of subsidiary issue selling for a certain period of time where the path dependent tendencies of 
the subsidiary’s relationship with CHQ were fully explored. Future studies should take a 
longitudinal perspective in order to shed light on how a subsidiary learns from its increased 
interactions with CHQ, and assess the evolution or pattern of its issue selling. A key question 
for future research involves how subsidiaries may effectively anticipate or even learn from 
negative CHQ attention. Alternatively, a key question from the CHQ perspective is how they 
may develop advanced formal communication or interaction mechanisms in order to enhance 
the attention given to critical subsidiary issues. We argue that future research should consider 
development of ‘global attention mindsets’ in corporate executives, which may help them 
identify and prioritise key issues early on. In doing so, we believe that CHQ can increase its 
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information processing capacity and its ability to determine the value of these issues at an early 
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Case 1: HEALTHCO 
Title Joined Past Experience Education 
Plant Manager 2000 
Business Unit/Site Director 
Operations Director  







Mechanical Engineer, Plant 
Manager  




1993 Financial Controller 
Degree in Accounting and 







Engineer, R&D Engineer, 
R&D Manager  
Diploma Industrial 
Engineering, Degree Product 






Manager, Senior Product 
Development Engineer  





Senior Product Development 
Manager, New Product 








1997 VP for R&D  Bachelor of Commerce Degree  
Case 2: MEDCO 
Manufacturing 
Director 







HRIS Analyst and Rewards 
Program Manager at MEDCO, 
HRIS Analyst for MEDCO 
 








Personnel Officer, Employee 
Relations Specialist, Rewards 
Manager 
Degree and Masters in HR, 












R&D Director 1997 R&D Manager 
Degree and Masters in 







Manager, Director of 
Operations 
Degree in Manufacturing 





2004 Senior HR Generalist 
Degree and Masters in HR, 
Diploma in Business Coaching 




2008 HR Manager, Career Coach  
Diploma in Management, 
Diploma in Business Coaching, 




Quality Manager, Managing 
Director 





2000 Engineering Technician 















MBS Banking & Finance, 





Quality Assurance & 
Regulatory Affairs Manager, 
Director of Design Assurance 
Degree in Mechanical 
Engineering, Masters in 
Operations and Quality 
Management 
Case 4: PHARMCO 
Plant Manager 2008 
Senior Director Manufacturing, 
Product Development Engineer  
Degree in Bio-Mechanical 






Senior Software Engineer, 
Principal Design Engineer, 
Engineering Manager  
Degree Electronic Engineering, 




Vendor Assurance Manager, 
Supply Chain Manager, Vendor 
Engineer. 
Degree in Manufacturing, 




2006 Senior Financial Accountant  







Senior QA Manager, Director 
of QA 
Degree in Microbiology, 
Masters in Biotechnology, 
Diploma Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturing Technology 
Quality Manager 2007 
Head of Quality Engineering & 
Validation 
Degree in Chemistry, Masters 
in Quality 





Senior HR Manager, HR 
Director, HR Manager, HR 
Consultant 
Degree in HR, Post Diploma 






Regional Press PR 
Communications Executive, 
IDA Ireland West Region 
Executive 








Table 3: Categorical Coding Process 
1st Order themes  (Summarising) 
Language used by Respondents 







“Somebody who has started here in operations is now a senior person in corporate and it is a huge 
advantage to us, that person knows us well, knows our capability, and can speak for us” (Senior 
HR Manager MEDCO). 
“We probably had the wrong person leading that function, they were not capable” (Plant Manager 
HEALTHCO). 
“One of the things that is very important is that promoting the new people in terms of the 
awareness from the broader group in headquarters” (VP of European Operations CHEMCO). 
 ‘Cooptation’ and 
‘Pollination’ of individual 
managers  
 Strategic and relational 
knowledge  




significance of formal role  
 
Peer Interactions 
“[CHQ] encourages best practice sharing so much that people are typically applauded for coming 
out and coming up with the great idea first” (Plant Manager PHARMCO).   
“Some plants are competitive and do well whereas others aren’t as competitive and they tend to loose 
certain product lines” (Corporate Representative PHARMCO). 
“…we do not sell ourselves as a low cost site” (Senior Manufacturing Director at MEDCO).  
 
 Coopetition  
 Consistent and coherent 
story telling  
 Image Control  
 Initiative Exporting 
Consequential legitimacy 
Evaluations of outcomes, 
activities, past performance 
accomplishments  
Local Environment 
 “Without the IDA’s support I would question whether a lot of this [investment] would have gone on” 
(Corporate Representative MEDCO). 
“When you talk to some of corporate that were over here they equate that to meeting [The U.S. 
President], so that is how huge it is … so the likes of [Ireland’s Prime Minister] coming down here” 
(Director of Engineering at CHEMCO). 
 “Political endorsements like this are massive so for example our Taoiseach would have met 
our current leader at a conference already” (HR Manager MEDCO). 
 Representation & coalition 
building 
 Political endorsements 
 Stroking the corporate ego 
 
Linkage legitimacy 
Trading on the reputation of 
partners, character 
references, stakeholders, 
endorsements or institutions 
“We want to hold this group strategically together so therefore they went back and gave us more 
funding” (VP Director Manufacturing MEDCO) 
“…the flow has shifted in that there is more coming from Ireland across to the U.S. now” (Director 
of Engineering CHEMCO) 
“We recently got approval to build a customer innovation centre” (HR Manager MEDCO).  
 Increased CHQ investment 
 Reverse knowledge transfer  
 Promotion of subsidiary 
managers to CHQ 
Positive Attention 
CHQ Recognises and gives 
credit  
Value creating activities 
“They don’t like us too much because we took their jobs” (HR Manager MEDCO).  
“We have been a victims of our own success and there is too many things coming at us” (Plant 
Manager HEALTHCO). 
 Changing reporting lines Negative Attention 
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“There was a change in reporting relationships, a guy in the US took over all the manufacturing 
plants worldwide” (Director of Strategic Planning and Infrastructure HEALTHCO) . 
“Unfortunately those projects were cancelled just a couple of weeks ago and we let 18 people go” 
(R&D Sustaining Manager PHARMCO) 
 Unrealistic expectations or 
demands 
 Inpatriation relocation 
 Mandate removal 
Increased CHQ Intervention 






Table 4: Personal Legitimacy 
“It is vital because the heart of the decision making process happens outside of the plants, 
key decisions do not get taken at plant level in general. To be honest my main reason for 
taking the role in the U.S. is to try and influence that little bit more and try and get greater 
visibility  
(Senior QA Manager PHARMCO). 
 
“Promoting the new people in terms of the awareness from the broader group [CHQ] that 
there are more people in R&D here so getting the guys to travel to [CHQ] and getting 
them to meet their peers and the senior people over there”  
(Plant Manager CHEMCO). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 “It has gone much better than I would have ever hoped…the Global Director of 
Engineering came from here too, and the vice president for overall R&D came from here 
so we have been able to populate the corporation’s structure”  
(Plant Manager HEALTHCO). 
 
“A lot of the leaders in [the subsidiary] have progressed up the ranks. So the head of Global 
Manufacturing has come from [the subsidiary] so that is a help because you are represented 
in a lot of those boards…that is the unwritten rule so its not spoken about but it’s the 
unwritten tendency”  
(HR Manager MEDCO). 
 
Table 5: Consequential Legitimacy  
“There is a whole set of metrics that the plant has to meet, so if you are meeting your 
metrics then you will be well up on the league table and this is important”  
(R&D Sustaining Manager PHARMCO). 
 
“The EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] award would be an example of this as they 
are not overly conscious of the environment in the U.S. We did a recycling program and 
they are now looking at this project so they have come back and asked questions about 
that”  
(VP International Finance CHEMCO). 
 
 “For instance if there is a new product and [HEALTHCO] doesn’t have an issue with it 
but the other plant does then it is like a little flag that makes things happen”  
(Plant Manager HEALTHCO). 
 
“There are a number of initiatives where it would be piloted in [our subsidiary] first… run 
for 6-12 months and then scale it into other plants around the world. If the pilot falls then 
the initiative will never take off”  




Table 6: Linkage Legitimacy 
“Our corporate guys made such a huge deal about it, we were lucky in that they both 
made a connection, certainly helped the fact that [The Prime Minister] knew me from 
back in the day, its really seen as important for the company, everybody likes getting their 
corporate ego stroked, he knew me, it was a big deal, it made national TV” 
(Plant Manager CHEMCO). 
 
“We have a government affairs office in Dublin and they interact with the government quite 
a lot and if there is any event happening they get politicians in”  
(R&D Sustaining Manager PHARMCO). 
 
“It is another way we stand out I think…it is not only do we produce new initiatives 
but we produce initiatives that are based on research. So we do not just say this is a 
good idea that everyone else is doing so therefore we are going to do it too. We go 
back a step and figure out why this is a good idea for us and is there a sound base on 
which you make that decision so everything back to literature reviews” 
   (Senior HR Manager MEDCO). 
 
“They have the knowledge as to what is out there and what is available and they are 
benchmarking within the med tech sector. The IDA actually facilitate this too in that they 
will say we are down in company X and we have a contact so do you want to come down 
and visit them?”  
(Financial Controller HEALTHCO). 
 
 
































   
Corporate Aggressors 
 
Passive Citizens 
 
 
Attention Champions 
 
Budding Stars 
 
